An	Analytic	Perspective	on	Panpsychism	-	Review	of: Godehard	Brüntrup	&	Ludwig	Jaskolla	(eds.),	Panpsychism:	Contemporary	Perspectives.	Oxford University	Press,	2017.	414	pages.	(ISBN:	9780199359943,	HB) In	Metascience	26	(3),	2017,	471-474.	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11016-017-0225-7 By	Gregory	Michael	Nixon University	of	Northern	British	Columbia,	Prince	George,	BC,	Canada "Panpsychism	is	stupid	because	rocks	can't	be	conscious," is	commonly	heard.	In	this	volume	of collected essays, philosophers of mind do a fine job of demonstrating that panpsychism is a significant and worthwhile question, at least for analytic philosophy. It is both a challenging introduction	to	the	topic	and	a	further	development	of	the	issues	involved	for	specialists.	Brüntrup and Jaskolla clarify this common misconception: "Most forms of panpsychism ... distinguish between mere conglomerates like a rock formation and genuine individuals like animals and possibly elementary particles. Mental properties can only be attributed directly to genuine individuals"	(p.	2).	Individuals	mean	primary	experiencers. To begin, the editors cite their approved very general definition of their central term: "Panpsychism is the doctrine that mind is a fundamental feature of the world which exists throughout the universe" (p. 1). However, this generic definition says nothing about the size, shape,	or	nature	of the	original	or	primal "minds"	or "mind" from	which	all	other	minds	derive. This	question	of	the	fundamental	nature	of	experiencing	entities	or	fields	seems	to	be	the	major one	being	addressed	in	these	pages. This is an important collection in that it fleshes	out the vague	postulate	of panpsychism	with a detailed	analysis	of	how	it	might	be	understood	(if	not	exactly	what	it	might	mean).	For	the	many skeptics	who	simply	dismiss	the	very	idea	as	ridiculous,	there	is	much	here	to	demonstrate	that	a good	deal	of	serious	thought	has	gone	into	this	ancient	proposal.	There	are	many	ways	to	interpret panpsychism, and they are	well represented in this group of philosophers, each speaking for a unique	take	on	the	subject	or	one	of	its	variations	–	from	cosmopsychism	to	panprotopsychism	to panexperientialism to	neutral	monism, etc.	The combination	problem is fully interrogated, as is panpsychism associated with dualism, idealism, physicalism, theism, etc. Anyone reading this book	is	bound	to	gain	some	respect	for	the	complexity	of	such	subject	matter	and	the	compelling logic	for	approaching	it. However, it is the entire logical edifice that leaves this writer somewhat dissatisfied. Despite widely different conclusions, each essay clearly seems to be written from within the analytic tradition,	often	centrally	relying	on	logical	syllogisms	to	strengthen	its	arguments.	This	is	fine	as far	as	it	goes	if	one	can	accept	sometimes	monotonous	reading,	but	the	problem	with	this	is	that such	arguments	most	often	are	limited	to	negatively	revealing	what	cannot	be	the	case,	not	what positively comes forth as intuition or revelation. Panpsychism itself is revealed to be a default position that	must	be	accepted	as	a	metaphysical	necessity since	experience	cannot logically	be understood to have somehow evolved within a non-experiencing reality without calling upon radical	emergence	or	magic,	which	are	much	the	same	thing. 472 Famed philosopher of consciousness, David Chalmers, figures prominently here. He wrote two keystone chapters for the book, one introducing a logical breakdown of the possible ways to interpret and understand panpsychism and the other to do much the same for panpsychism's combination	problem.	Chalmers is	a	deeply incisive	thinker	who	is	able	to	bring	out	unexpected hidden angles in any topic; however, his ability to clarify by complexity is not matched by an ability	to	clarify	by	simplifying. In Section I, "The Logical Place of Panpsychism", Chalmers first sets up the parameters of the discussion	to	follow	with	some	important	clarifications,	emphasizing	that	experience	likely	begins with the very small or very brief, as does the physical world. Chalmers astutely outlines all possible interpretations	of this reductive	stand,	outlining the	similarities	and	differences	among panpsychism, panexperientialism (all things experience but not necessarily consciously), and panprotopsychism (fundamental entities are proto-conscious but must combine to produce consciousness):	"Panprotopsychism	is	then	the	view	that	some	fundamental	physical	entities	have protophenomenal	properties"	(p.	31).	However,	Brüntrup	notes	that	panprotopsychism	implies	a radical emergence from non-experiencing protophenomena to experiencing phenomena, so it does	not	seem	to	have	solved	the	hard	problem.	Just	what	a	protophenomenal	property	might	be or	how	it	could	emerge	into	phenomenality	is	never	explained.	Brüntrup	sees	that	wholes	that	are greater	than	their	parts	may	emerge:	"There	is	an	opening	for	macrolevel	agents	to	make	a	causal difference. This is a genuine difference from constitutive panpsychism" (p. 69). This is a good point	though	the	nature	of	the	pre-phenomenal	remains	a	mystery.	But	then	none	of	these	essays ever	really	attempts	to	deal	with	just	what	a	microsubjective	experience	might	be	like. Section II includes	wide ranging essays on possible panpsychist ontologies. Strawson offers his ironic	view	of	a	self-conscious	panpsychism	that	yet	leaves	physical	science	fully	intact.	Nagasawa and	Wager	give	priority	to	the	cosmos	as	a	whole	over	its	parts:	"...priority	cosmopsychism	says that	exactly	one	basic	consciousness,	the	cosmic	consciousness,	exists"	(p.	116).	So	in	this	case	the cosmos	decomposes into	smaller	units	of	experience	or	consciousness, like	our	own,	rather than combining	from	the	very	small	and	rudimentary	into	larger	units.	Brogaard's	chapter	searches	for mentons,	mental	experience	equivalents	of	gravitons,	which	I	found	perplexing. But if Brogaard left me perplexed, Rosenberg's much anticipated chapter sometimes left me feeling	all	at	sea	–	even	though	it	was	entitled	"Land	Ho"!	I	have	long	intended	to	read	Rosenberg's version	of	panexperientialism,	for	Whiteheadian	panexperientialism	is	where	my	sympathies	lie. However,	Rosenberg looks to	his alternative to classical cause-and-effect – the	Theory	of	Causal Significance (TCS)	– to	extoll the	necessity for	pan-experience in the	world, though	TCS	remains unclear. Section	III	deals	with	panpsychism's	combination	problem:	how	could	the	micro-subjects	or	microexperiences	combine into	becoming full-fledged	macro-subjects	of	consciousness like	ourselves? Chalmers	and	other	notables	offer	their	attempts	to	deal	with	this	problem	but	physicalist	Barbara Gail Montero simply asks, "What Combination Problem?" by noting that experiences combine more	readily	than	do	objects. The	last	section,	"Panpsychism	and	Its	Alternatives",	dares	to	be	more	speculative	while	not	really dealing with panpsychism, as such. McLaughlin comes up with the contorted notion of 473 panprotoexperientialism,	which	I	defy	anyone	to	clearly	differentiate	from	panprotopsychism,	but he	ends	by	declaring	himself	ultimately in favour	of	neurobiologicalism.	The	other	pieces in this section	seem	unwilling	to	grasp	the	uniqueness	of	panpsychism,	so	they	offer	instead	alternative ontologies. The jumble of charts used by Stephan cannot hide the fact that strong emergence cannot	be	panpsychism,	which	posits	actual	experience	from	the	universal	get-go.	Stubenberg	has more luck with a very strong essay suggesting neutral monism as the necessary ontological background for panpsychism, which is indeed compatible. The last two chapters by Taliaferro bringing in	dualism	and	Meixner	supporting idealism	do	not	seem	to	see	that their	perspectives leave	panpsychism	behind.	Both	end	up	calling	upon	theism	(implying	God)	as	ultimate.	However, panpsychism	if	associated	with	theism	would	likely	be	polytheistic	or	pantheistic. Can	panpsychism	ever	be	shown	to	be	a	phenomenological	reality?	None	of	these	essays	give	any indication	panpsychism	is	anything	more	than	a	default	position,	arrived	at	by	a	process	of	logical elimination. If panpsychism in any form	were ever revealed as likely, it	would lead to a	major upheaval in the world of physics and in our relation to nature. We would find ourselves subjectively	connected	with	all	other	aspects	of	reality,	as	poets	have	experienced.	Surely	such	an awesome possibility cries out for a philosophical phenomenology or even a literary treatment beyond	the	grim	objective	tedium	offered	by	analytical	deduction. Phenomenological philosopher Merleau-Ponty (1968) hinted that only the undoing of memory could	lead	us	to	the	hollows	of	being	where	our	experiential	origins	lie:	"If	being	is	to	unveil	itself, it	will	be	in	the	face	of	a	transcendence	and	not	an	intentionality;	it	will	be	brute	being	caught	in the	shifting	sands,	a	being	that	reverts	to	itself:	it	will	be	the	sensible	hollowing	itself	out"	(p.	210). The	other	suggestion	to	discovering	awareness	in	all	things	is	via	poetic	reverie.	Allow	me	to	close this	review	with	the	words	of	William	Wordsworth	(1798)	when	he	was inspired	to	express	his own	vision	of	panpsychism,	perhaps	even	pantheism,	with	the	wonder	intact: -And	I	have	felt A	presence	that	disturbs	me	with	the	joy Of	elevated	thoughts;	a	sense	sublime Of	something	far	more	deeply	interfused, Whose	dwelling	is	the	light	of	setting	suns, And	the	round	ocean	and	the	living	air, And	the	blue	sky,	and	in	the	mind	of	man. Then again, this sort of obfuscation or romantic allusion	may be just the sort of thing to leave materialist	skeptics	in	apoplectic	horror. References Merleau-Ponty,	M.	(1968).	The	visible	and	the	invisible,	followed	by	working	notes	(A.	Lingis,	Trans.). Northwestern University Press. (Original in French: Le	Visible et l'invisible, suivi de notes de travail,	C.	Lefort,	Ed.,	Paris:	Gallimard,	1964.) 474 Wordsworth,	W. (1798). "Lines Composed a Few	Miles above Tintern	Abbey, On	Revisiting the Banks	of the	Wye	during a	Tour. July	13, 1798." In	W.	Wordsworth	&	S.T. Coleridge,	Lyrical Ballads	(1st	ed).	London:	J.	&	A.	Arch.	Retrieved	29	June	2017,	via	archive.org